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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
R. M. SCOVILLE, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
KELLOGG SALES COMPANY, 
Respondent. 
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Case No. 
7824 
Respondent agrees with appellant's statement of facts 
where such are facts and not arguments or mere conclu-
sions. Because of the length of the facts set out, we be-
lieve it will serve the interest and convenience of the 
court to refrain from restating all of the facts but to 
merely point out a few of the following: 
On page 4 in the last sentence in the first para-
graph, the word ubuilding" should ·be ubilling." 
In the first paragraph on page 5, Mr. Leslie Carl 
Borsum should be designated as an employee of Kellogg 
Company, (R. 84) and that appellant testified that Mr. 
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2 
Borsum was sales manager for the U. S. for Kellogg Sales 
Company. 
In all. three paragraphs on page 5, appellant indulges 
in arguments and conclusions by stating that reasonable 
inferences Ctcould be," ucan be" and umay be" drawn 
from the respective conversations. The conversations are 
set out in the record and the briefs and speak for them-
selves. In like manner the last paragraph beginning on 
page 5 and ending on page 6 contains the statement that 
an inference may be . drawn from a letter written July 
24, 1949. This letter (Exhibit 10) speaks for itself. 
In the last paragraph on page 6, the statement that 
Mr. Scoville protested several times orally to Mr. Wil-
liams and Mr. Borsum should conform to the record. A 
more accurate condensation of this would be that Mr. 
Scoville talked with Mr. Williams several times about the 
bonus·, but what was said about these things would be 
just short and he couldn't repeat them for the court. 
(R. 28 ). He protested in several talks with. Mr. Williams 
and Mr. Borsum in Minneapolis the following January. 
(R. 72). 
The third paragraph on page 8 should state the 
check for $1,026.98 transmitted by the letter dated April 
25, 1950, was specified in the letter as representing the 
balance due on Mr. Scoville's bonus for 1949. 
·STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT 1 
THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED PAROL EVIDENCE 
OFFERED BY APPELLANT TO VARY, MODIFY OR CONTRA-
DICT A WRITTEN. INSTRUMENT. 
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POINT 2 
THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED CERTAIN TESTI-
MONY OF TiiE WITNESS, BORSUM, ON TiiE GROUND SUCH 
TESTIMONY WAS NOT BINDING UPON KELLOGG SALES 
COMPANY. 
POINT 3 
TiiE COURT PROPERLY DIRECTED A VERDiCT IN 
FAVOR OF TiiE DEFENDANT AND AGAINST THE PLAIN-
TIFF 
POINT I 
THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED PAROL 
EVIDENCE OFFERED BY APPELLANT TO VARY, 
MODIFY OR CONTRADICT A WRITTEN IN-
STRUMENT. 
Respondent respectfully points out to this court that 
Points I and II of appdlant's brief are diametrically op- · 
posed to each other and so inconsistent as to preclude 
relief under either. Because of this inconsistency, we will 
discuss Points I and II of appellant's brief together. 
We do not quarrel with appellant's authorities cited 
in Point I which support the rule that a subsequent agree-
ment may be shown by parol evidence to vary or modify 
a written instrument. Parker vs. Weber County Irr. 
Dist., 65 Utah 354, 236 Pac. 1105 (Utah 19~5); Hogan 
vs. Swayze, 65 Utah 380, 237 Pac. 1097 (Utah 1925); 
32 C. J. S., Section 1004, at page 1008. Under Point I 
appellant apparently claims that the alleged conversa-
tions were admissible because they were made prior to 
the 1949 written instrument and were made to modify, 
vary or contradict the 1948 bonus plan, yet he seeks to 
recover on the terms of the 1948 written instrument on 
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the theory that such instrument remained in effect for 
him for services performed in 1949. 
In Point II he asserts that such conversations were 
admissible, though prior to the receipt and acknowledg-
ment of the 1949 instrument, to show that a different 
agreement existed between the parties than was repre-
sented in the 1949 instrument. In other words, parol 
evidence or conversations prior in time to the 1949 in-
strument were purportedly admissible to show that Sco-
ville, the appellant and plaintiff, had never assented to 
the 1949 agreement before it was written and, therefore, 
the conversations were admissible to abrogate the same. 
We submit that the following facts are undisputed 
in the record. First, that the 1949 written instrument, 
called the 1949 Bonus Plan, was received and acknowl-
edged. by Scoville in 1949. Second, that Scoville received 
a statement of his account and payments under the 1949 
bonus plan. Third, that the conversations designated in 
Point I as admissible were made prior to the receipt of 
the 1949 written instrument. 
Considering the assertion that the alleged conversa-
tions related to the 1948 instrument, we cite from the 
general rule given as authority by appellant and contained 
in 32 C. ]. S., Section 1004 at pages 1009-10. 
u * * It must appear, however, that there was 
a subsequent agreement, mere negotiations or repre-
sentations being insufficient; and it is usually neces-
sary that such subsequent agreement be founded on 
a consideration, although a contrary view has been 
asserted. * * * " (italics ours.) 
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The conversations Mr. Scoville testified to and re-
lied upon by inference to alter, vary or contradict a writ-
ten instrument speak for themselves. Here are the perti-
ent parts: 
At breakfast in Portland Mr. Borsum allegedly said: 
uHe said: cHe didn~t see any reason why the 
bonus should be changed at that time, there was 
nothing that should be changed in the setup, for 
1949. He also stated the thing he would want me 
to do, when I got my bonus, was to buy a home and 
settle down in it. I had been traveling too much. 
uHe said: cl think if you would spend about 
$4,000.00 for a home it would be adequate for ·you 
and Helen to live in.'" (R. 23-24.) (italics ours) 
In the hotel room in Omaha, Nebraska, the perti-
nent parts of the conversation as related by Mr. Sco-
ville were: 
ui asked both Mr. Borsum and Mr. Williams, 
if they thought I had about enough turkey con-
tracts in this territory. 
uAnd Mr. Williams stated I should go ahead 
and sell all the contracts I could. He ,could make the 
feed. He was in charge of the Omaha Plant. 
ul said: ty ou are also going to pay me a lot of 
bonus too.' 
uHe said: cw e have got money to pay the 
bonus, you sell the feed.' 
UThen we left the . room and started down-
stairs. 
cc;Q. Who left the room? 
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uA. Mr. Borsum, Mr. Williams and myself 
left the room to go downstairs. 
ttl said: (Bill, it will take a lot of feed, and I 
will get a lot of bonus, it is pretty near time to shut 
Qtf out there.' 
uHe said: (We will take care of you, Kellogg 
has got plenty of money and we will make the 
feed/ " (R. 25-26) . 
Mrs. Scoville testified about the same conversation 
in general terms. (R. 79) 
Appellant claims that these statements, made prior 
to the 1949 written instrument, infer uthat there would 
be a bonus for the year 1949 and that such bonus would 
be computed at the rate of $2.00 per ton of feed sold 
as which [sic] is the same rate provided in the agree-
ment of 1948." 
We agree that the parties inferred that there would 
be a bonus for 1949. The only conclusion that can be 
reached is that a bonus plan for 1949 was anticipated. 
The last paragraph of the 1948 bonus plan specifically 
so provides: 
uof course this means that' we will look at the 
situation at the end of 1948 and see if this is the 
best possible . bonus arrangement, both from the 
standpoint of the individual salesman and the Kel-
logg CQmpany." , 
. To· designate. a statement made by one of the parties 
that he usaw no reason why the bonus ·should be changed 
at . that time'' · as having the effect of an offer that it 
wouldn't be changed in the future does violence to even 
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an inference. It is interesting to note that whenever Mr. 
Scoville mentioned a sum of $30,000.00, ·the ·other party 
returned with a statement similar to uh~ emphatically 
stated he would like very much for us to find a home 
somewhere and buy it, he thought a $4,000.00-home 
would be adequate for us." (R .. 24, 78) Similarly, no 
inference such as appellant seeks can be found in either 
the statement uYou are going to ·pay me a lot .of. bonus 
too" or the answer uw e have got money to pay the bonus, 
you sell the feed." Although Mrs. Scoville was not a 
party to the agreement, she testified that the conversa-
tion just referred to took place prior to the time the 1949 
bonus plan was received by her husband. 
If we must indulge in inferences in an attempt to 
vary a written instrument, the most that can be inferred 
is that a plan for 1949 was expected to be . announced 
some time in 1949. Mrs. Scoville knew her husband 
received or had received the 1949 bonus plan in July or 
August of 1949 and she had read it. (R. 79-80) 
She also knew that it had been discussed and an-
ticipated: 
ul know there was a lot of quibble, a lot of 
quibble going on the latter part of July about the 
payment of this. It is possible Mr. Scoville did 
get a letter from them· with reference to it, but 
this did not come out until after the correspondence 
in July was concluded." (R. 80) 
We respectfully submit to this court that all·conver-
versations upon which appellant attempted· to rely 
refer to the 1949 written instrument providing for a 
bonus plan in that year, and nowhere in the record is 
there any affirmative evidence of a promise or offer of 
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anything different. The most comfort appellant can 
glean from such iconversations would be that they were 
uinerely negotiations or representations," and such are 
insufficient to establish any substantial uagreement.'' 32 
C. J. S. Section 1004, pp. 1008-10. 
In the case of Hogan vs. Swayze, supra, the elemen-
tary rule is given: · 
ult may be said in passing, however, that the 
rule that parol evidence is inadmissible to vary the 
terms of a plain, unambiguous instrument, in writ-
ing, is elementary in this and every other jurisdic-
tion of the country." 
By plaintiff's .. very pleading and testimony, he seeks 
to recover on the theory that the bonus plan for 1949 
received in July or August of that year was varied, 
changed or modified by prior oral conversations or agree-
ments, and thus it did not apply to him. It is the terms 
of the 1949 bonus plan that plaintiff seeks to escape and 
in open court so stated as shown by the record at page 
2 3, set out in appellant's brief at page 13: 
uMR. CALLISTER: If the court please, it is 
no attempt to vary a written contract, it is an at-
tempt to vary one not received until July or 
August, 1949. This conversation took place the 
latter ·part of 1948." 
It should not now be counsel's pleasure to say he 
did not mean what he said. 
The 1948 bonus plan expired at the end of 1948, 
and Mr. Scoville was paid according thereto for his serv· 
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ices for that. year. As set out heretofore, the 1948 bonus 
plan specifically stated that it was the bonus plan for 
1948 and that it would be reexamined at the end of that 
year. 
Subsequent to the conversations testified to by Mr. 
Scoville, the 1949 writing was sent to Mr. Scoville who 
acknowledged receipt of it (R. 18, 19, 3~, 56, 62, 63). He 
thereafter acknowledged a statement of his accounts and 
payments in accordance with such writing and made no 
formal protest until some seventeen months after he re-
ceived it. This bonus plan was admitted into evidence 
without objection as Mr. Scoville's Exhibit uB" and in 
part provides as follows: · 
ult is the company's desire to be fair to its em-
ployees, to its stockholders, and to the company 
itself. · 
ult is management's thinking that each man is 
worthy of his hire, but we do have certain limita-
tions which we must consider on an allover basis 
insofar as the company is concerned. 
uThe bonus plan -covered in Bulletin #148-3 
dated January 29, 1948 expired as of December 31, 
1948. .The bonus plan for 1949 ·which we feel is 
fair to all concerned is as follows: 
CREDIT TOWARD BONUS 
First 2,000 tons of feed sold 
(hog, cattle, turkey and 
poultry) .50 per ton allowance 
Balance of financed feed 
sold 1 .. 00 per ton allowance 
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All non-financed feeds 
sold 2.00 per ton allowance 
uAgainst your b~n\ls credit will be charged 
your territory expense al').d salary. We feel that 
the above bonus plan is an equitable one as far as 
the company and the salesmen are concerned, espe-
cially when· you consider that most of the salesmen 
in the feed department are now members of the 
Kellogg Sales Company Savings Plan and partici-
pate in the profits of the company. 
* * * 
uThe above bonus plan covers 1949 operation only." 
* * ". 
There is no ambiguity in this statement, uThe bonus 
plan covered in Bulletin #148-3 dated January 29, 1948 
e~pired as of December 31, 1948." The only purported 
conversation testified to after the bonus plan for 1949 was 
received by him allegedly took place in Minneapolis on 
January 9, 1949, when the follow:ing was said: 
·"".A. Mr. Borsum told me I would have to 
follow ·the new schedule of· the bonus· which was 
issued in August, that he had sent out, and that he 
didn't think it was a good thing that I should 
make any trouble about it or say anything, or dis-
cuss it, because that is the way it was and that is 
the way it had to be. 
. ' 
uThf}t if anything was said, if I took it up 
with the higher.:.ups both him arid Mr. Williams and 
myself would all lose our jobs, and if I kept my 
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mouth shut· I could stay on inde:finiteJy as long as 
I was doing the job." (R. 29) 
Here certainly is no protest nor does it indicate any-
thing but an acceptance of the 1949 writing, and the 
subsequent events confirm such acceptance. A letter 
dated January 10, 1950 was written .by Mr. Williams to 
Mr. Scoville. It is designated as Exhibit u3'' and provides: 
uDear Ray: 
uw e are discontinuing the Bonus Plan which 
was in effect in 1949 and we will not have a Bonus 
Plan for 1950. 
uwe are advancing your salary··effective Jan-
uary 1, 1950 from $325.00 per month to $375.00 
per month. 
ccThis will confirm our recent conversation." 
It is apparent from this letter that the company and 
Mr. Williams had considered the bonits plan for 1949 in 
effect, for it was specifically discontinued. Thereafter, 
on January 30, 1950, Mr. Williams wrote to Mr. Scoville 
enclosing a check for his bonus for the year 1949 and a 
statement of the sales and calculations. The letter (Exhibit 
u6") is only two paragraphs ~ong, and for the convenience 
of the court we cite these two paragraphs: 
uDearRay: 
uPlease :find enclosed, our check· in the amount 
of $3544.35 to cover Bonus for the year 1949. Also 
:find enclosed a statement showing the feed sales, 
whether financed. or non-financed, and the calcula-
tion based on ·the Bonus Plan for 1949. · 
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ttlt was necessary to go ahead and clean this 
matter up based on the figures we have, but subject 
to revision, if the figures which you are sending 
-prove ours to be· incorrect. We will appreciate 
having you forward Helen's :figures as soon as pos-
sible so we can check this out, but we did have to 
close our books for 1949 and that is the reason 
for going ahead and making the calculation." 
It is apparent the check and statement were for pay-
ment under the 1949 bonus p~an. In fact, Exhibit u7", 
a letter written February 10, 1950 acknowledges receipt 
of the check, for Mr. Scoville had returned it due to an 
errQr m the deduction of withholding tax. Mr. Scoville 
does not deny the circumstances surrounding the letter. 
In fact, he admitted having the original. (R. 49-50). 
On February 6, 1950, a check in the amount of 
$2,981.92 representing the amount of the previous check 
less withholding tax was drawn· payable to Scoville and 
received, endorsed and cashed by him. (R. 51-52) . On 
April 25, 1950 a letter was sent to Mr. Scoville enclosing· 
a check in the amount of $1,026.88 representing the bal-
ance due on his bonus for 1949. (Exhibit uS"). Mr. Sco-
ville was praised for his work for 1949, and told that the 
company had a great deal of money outstanding on his 
accounts in this area and that they were going to hold him 
responsible for getting the money in. The following state-
ment in that letter requires no further ·explanation: 
~ uAttached find check in the amount of 
$1,026.·88.representing balance due on your bonus 
for 1949." · 
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Exhibit u9" is a statement of Mr. Scoville's account 
under the 1949 plan. It was the subject of some contro-
versy, but Mr. Scoville admitted receiving a statement of 
his accounts and for feed tonnage (R. 52) and that 
Exhibit u9, may or may not be the statement he received. 
(R. 53) . Subsequently he adopted the :figures therein as 
his own and the exhibit was admitted in evidence (R. 7 4) • 
Mr. Scoville accepted the checks, endorsed and cashed 
them. Thereafter no protest, complaint nor demands of 
any kind were made by Mr. Scoville until December 30, 
1950, the day before his retirement became effective. 
Appellant alleges in his brief that Mr. Scoville protested 
several times orally to Mr. Williams concerning the 1949 
writing (appellant's brief 24-25). The record ·shows 
what is relied on for a positive protest orally in the ex-
cerpted references to the record. 
uQ. Now, after receiving that bulletin, 
Exhibit B, did you enter a protest or talk with any 
of the officials of the company? 
uA. Not at the - I wrote them a letter at 
that time but there was nothing more said about it. 
uQ. Did you ever have any conversation 
with Mr. Williams subsequently to the time you 
received that bonus - that exhibit? 
uA. Well, Mr. Williams and I talked a lot of 
times whenever he was with me, about the bonus, 
but what was said about these things would just be 
very short and I can't repeat it." (R. 28) 
* * * 
ceQ. I am asking, and you have told ·me, it is 
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you were afraid of losing your job was the reason 
you didn't protest before, - I am asking if there 
were any other reasons you didn't make active 
protest? 
. uA. I had made several in talks, in conversa-
tions to Mr. Williams and Mr. Borsum when in 
Minneapolis in January, I wasn't in a shape to ac-
cept anything, I accepted anything they had in 
mind because I wasn't all together." (R. 72) 
Appellant gives as a reason for no protest after receiv-
ing the letters set out above and the receipt of the :figur~ 
and th~ cashing of checks, that he feared losing his job. 
The cross examination of Mr. Scoville is revealing: 
UBY MR. AADNESEN: 
uQ. Just one or two more questions. Do you 
have any idea of the policy of the company at the 
time you joined it, as to the age of retirement? 
ttA. Did I have? 
ttQ. Yes. 
uQ. When was that? 
u.A. ~ey could retire me at 60, or could 
retire me a~ 65. (R. 72-73) 
* * * 
uQ. Mr. Scoyille, Mr. Aadnesen also asked 
·you on cross examination about your retiring from 
Kellogg's, ·will you explain retiring from Kellogg's? 
uA. I ret~red January 1, 1951. 
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uQ. Was that voluntary upon your part? 
uA. They make it voluntary in a nice way. 
(R. 68) 
* * * 
<<Q. 1950. Now, at that time what was your 
status with the company? ·. 
ttA. I was on my way out. 
uQ. You were retired, weren't you? 
ttA. Yes sir. 
uQ. And you retired, did you not? 
uQ. You retire~ did you not? 
uA. As far as Kellogg's were concerned. 
uQ. And you had retired effective what date? 
uA. January 1, 1951. 
uQ. So this was written . just on the eve of 
your effective date of retirement, was it not? 
uA Yes sir." (R. 62) 
The record .. shows that Mr. Sc.oville was 65 years of 
age in April, 1952. He was subject to retirement and. 
could have retired or been retired any time since 1947, 
and he knew it 
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In Point I of his brief, appellant seeks to escape the 
elementary rule of parol evidence announced by our 
court in Hogan vs. Swayze, supra, by alleging that all 
conversations relating to bonus payments for services per-
formed in 1949 related to the 1948 bonus plan. It is per-
force admitted by appellant that if these related to the 
1949 bonus plan they were made prior to the acknowledg-
ment and receipt of the 1949 plan and would be inad-
missible under the. foregoing rule. We submit that the 
only affirmative evidence in the record conclusively estab-
lishes that such conversations referred to a bonus plan 
for 1949 and show concern for what the terms of such a 
plan would be. Most certainly, as Mr. Callister informed 
the court, they are an uattempt to vary one not received 
until July or August, 1949." (R. 23). The court was 
most certainly entitled to rely upon information from 
counsel as to the purpose of these conversations, and 
appellant should not now attempt to escape their inad-
missibility by claiming they relate to a prior or an en-
tirely separate agreement. 
· In Point II of appellant's brief, the position is taken 
that parol evidence to prove a prior oral agreement dif-
ferent in its terms from a purported written agreement 
is admissible. This statement is in direct conflict with 
the authorities cited in Point I. Appellant then goes on 
to say that the trial court erred in excluding testimony 
adduced to prove the verbal agreement different in its 
terms ·from the purported written agreement which was 
never assented to. Appellant then states at page 23 of his 
brief uA writing was introduced in evidence which 
was subsequent to the conversations and the implied 
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agreement, which writing the Company contended was a 
written agreement which could not be modified by parol 
evidence." The inconsistency between Point I and Point 
II is readily apparent and conclusive upon the appella~t 
that the only purpose of the alleged conversations could 
be to modify, vary or abrogate the 1949 writing. 
Appellant asserts that he. never assented to the 1949 
bonus plan, and hence it was not the agreement between 
the parties. We respectfully submit that both the 1948 
and the 1949 plans were letters similar in form and con-
tent. They were sent and received and payment com-
puted in accordance to their respective terms at the ex-
piration of the 1948 and. 1949 periods. The only affirma-
tive, undisputed evidence is that Mr. Scoville received 
and acknowledged the 1949 plan. 
uQ. (BY MR. CALLISTER) Well, Mr. Sco-
ville, did you ever receive any communication by 
word, or by letter, or bulletin,.that the 1948 bonus 
arrangement was terminated? 
teA. Yes sir. 
uQ. And when was that? 
uA. In August is the first, the last of July or 
August. 
uQ. Of what years? 
uA. 1949. (R. 18) 
* * * 
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uQ. Do you, recall. writing to the company 
on January 24th, 1949, from. Idaho Falls, Idaho? 
u.A .. l couldn't tell you what the date was, I 
wrote so many letters - we wrote so many letters, 
I don't knpw. whether I wrote from·· Idaho Falls or 
not. I was all over this western territory. - I 
wouldn't answer it that way. 
uQ. Perhaps I can refresh your recollection, 
did you write this letter? 
uA. I did. 
uQ. . The first part of which you read,-right 
here, - and tell me whether you know now the 
date of the bonus plan of 1949? 
uA. Which paragraph do you mean? 
((Right here where you have your thumb. 
uA. Right here? 
(Also your letter of July 11th, regarding the 
bonU.S plan, which of course is very important to 
me, I have read it very carefully, but I am not 
ready to give you my thoughts on it for my feed 
business is practically assured from the start. And 
{rom the wording of this letter I can see where it 
could be changed tp where I would not get any 
bonus. · 
~Not only that Les, -' 
uQ. That has nothing to do with it. 
uA. It is still in the paragraph. 
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MR. QUINNEY: Let him read it. 
ttQ. (by Mr. Aadnesen) . Do you want to 
read it? 
uA. It doesn't make any differen~e to me, if 
you don't want to read. 
uQ. You acknowledged receipt of the bonus 
plan for 1949, didn't you? 
uA. Yes sir. 
ttQ. That is dated July 11th, isn't that cor-
rect? 
ttA. According to that letter it is talked 
about. 
«tQ. This is your letter, Mr. Scoville? 
uA. That is right." (R. 32-3 3) 
Even the alleged conversation in Minneapolis indi-
cates that he accepted it because he did not want to lose 
his job. He stated that· he received a statement 'of his 
accounts for 1949 under this agreement which appellant 
designates as upurported," and thereafter received and 
returned one check because no withholding tax had been 
deducted. He received, endorsed and cashed two subse-
quent checks representing payments under the· 1949 writ-
ing. All this he did without murmur or complaint and 
then waited nearly a year to register a complaint. 
There is no dispute to this evidence and appellant 
admits it in his brief~ No jury question presents itself 
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from undiSputed evidence~ and the court was faced with 
a question of law, upon which he ruled. As will be pointed 
out hereafter· under another point appellant was estopped 
to deny the 1949 writing and his actions established accord 
and satisfaction or an account stated, upon which grounds 
the court properly granted a directed verdict for the 
defendant. 
Appellant indicates that Mr. Scoville had done all of 
his work and all of the contracts had been sent in to the 
company prior to July 1, 1949, and that the 1949 bonus 
plan received thereafter could not apply to him. The 
record reflects the procedure of Mr. Scoville and the com-
pany in selling and in reality _sh~ws the contrary. The 
1948 bonus applied to all feeds as did the 1949 bonus 
plan. However, the 1949 bonus plan provided a bonus 
of 50 cents per ton on the first 2,000 tons of financed 
feed, and $1.00 per ton on the balance of financed feed 
sold. All nonfinanced feed sold carried a bonus of $2.00 
per ton. Exhibit ((9" shows Mr. Scoville received a credit 
of $1,330.00 for .665 .tons of non:fi.nanced feed at $2.00 
per ton, $1,000.00 for 2,000 _tons of financed- feed at 50 
cents a ton, and $12,452.00 for 12,452 tons at $1.00 per 
ton. In fact, after .deducting his salary and expenses paid 
him during the year amounting to $10,971.67 he received 
an additional $4,7 42.3 3 in bonus, a total f~r the year of 
$15,714.00. The Kellogg Sales Company had its own 
turkey financing program and they wanted all the feed 
possible. Mr. Scoville was to call on the de.alers and 
customers that used the feed and the dealers WO\lld get 
the turkey men to sign the contracts. The dealers would 
check the contracts off and send them to Mr. Williams at 
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Omaha. The Omaha office would take care of them and 
send the contracts containing the program for the 
customers to use during that year back to Scoville and 
the customer after they were approved. These were esti-
mates of the amount of feed the customer would require 
and some would use less than the estimate and some 
wouldn't use any but cancel out. During the year, the 
dealers of Scoville notified Omaha what amount of feed 
was needed and it took about ten days to come out. When 
it was shipped, Scoville received invoices, and these in-
voices are what he used for his tonnage :figures to figure 
his bonus payments. He had no idea how much feed was 
shipped prior to July, 1949. We respectfully submit that 
the court may take judicial notice of the feeding 
habits of turkeys during the year and the fact that Thanks-
giving was late in November, 1949. 
POINT 2 
THE COURT PROPERLY EXCLUDED CER-
TAIN TESTIMONY OF THE WITNESS, BORSUM, 
ON THE GROUND SUCH TESTIMONY WAS NOT 
BINDING UPON KELLOGG SALES CO:MPANY. 
Mr. Scoville was employed by Kellogg Sales Company. 
He knew there were two companie~, Kellogg Sales Com-
pany and Kellogg Company. 
UBY MR. AADNESEN: 
uQ. I have just ·a few questions, Mr. Scoville, 
I think it best to begin at the beginning where you 
did. 
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· uYou stated ·you were first employed August 
15, 1944? 
uA. Yes, I think that is correct. 
uQ That is the Kellogg Sales Company? 
uA. · Yes. 
uQ. You have never worked for Kellogg 
Company? 
((A. At that time I think both of them were 
more or less together. 
uQ. Do you know? 
uA. If anybody could keep up with them, I 
couldn't, whether they was single companies or 
whether they was parent companies. 
t.:Kellogg Company is-
_.:.:Q •. You understand they are two separate 
companies? 
u .!)... Yes sir . 
.:.<Q. - You worked for Kellogg Sales Company, 
is that correct? 
uA. · I had a savings· fund in Kellogg Com-
··pany, as well as Kellogg Sales Company." (R. 29) 
Mr. Scoville also stated that he knew Mr. Borsum was 
sales manager for the U.S. for the Kellogg Sales Company. 
He testified that he knew this of his own knowledge be-
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cause he got the information from Mr. Borsum himself. 
The general rule of law regarding an admissible statement 
and declarations by one alleged to be the agent of another 
is well stated in 20 Am. Jur. 508, §598: 
((There is a general rule that the admissions, 
statements, and declarations of one alleged to be 
the agent of another, other than his testimony in 
the case in which the issue arises, are not admissible 
either to prove the fact of his agency or the extent 
of his authority as an agent. It follows that as a 
general rule the preliminary proof of agency requi-
site to render the statements of one p~rson ad-
missible against another must be made by evidence 
other than declarations of the alleg~d agent, not 
brought to the knowledge of the principal." 
The case of Cole v. Myers, 128 Conn. 223, 21 A. 2d 
396, 136 ALR 226, reiterates the rule: 
ult is well settled that authority of an agent 
cannot be proven by declarations of . the agent, 
Bailey v. Bobecki, 117 Conn. 653, 654, 166 A 677; 
Voegeli v. Waterbury Yellow Cab Co., 111 Conn. 
407, 411, 150 A 303, 69 ALR 902; Taylor v. 
Commercial Bank, 174 NY 181, 191, 66 NE 726, 
62 LRA 783, 95 Am St. Rep 564; 2 Am Jur 357." 
What Mr. Kellogg said Mr. Borsum.had ·said does not 
constitute evidence sufficient to establish Mr. Borsum as 
having the authority to bind Kellogg. Sales Company. 
Mr. Borsum was called as a witness and testified that 
he was employed by Kellogg Company. (R. 8 3). Appellant 
had ample opportunity to inquire as to length of serv-
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ice and authority to bind the corporate defendant when 
Mr. Borsum was on the stand. If such was the case as they 
maintain, appel\ant cannot now rely upon the lack of 
testimony resulting from his failure to adduce testimony. 
Andersonv. Thomas, 108 Utah 252, 159 P. 2d 142. 
The burden of proof is upon the plaintiff to prove 
his case and to now say there was no evidence that during · 
the time in question in this action Mr. Borsum was not 
employed by Kellogg Sales Company, or that it can be · 
inferred that he had authority to bind Kellogg Sales Com-
pany at the time of the convers·ations, is an attempt to 
place this burden upon the defendant. The authorities are 
all in agreement upon such a proposition. In 20 Am. Jur. 
508, § 597, the rule is stated: 
uThe burden of proof lies upon the party who 
introduces the-statements of an agent for the pur-
pose of binding the principal to show that the 
declarations were within the agent's authority." 
This burden of proof requires more than a mere state-
ment, and it must be shown that not only was there 
competency, but the admissions must have been made in 
the discharge of the agent's duty and must be a statement 
of fact rather than an expression of opinion. This rule is 
well stated in 31 C.J.S., § 343 at page 1115. 
uCompetency of the agent to make admissions 
on the ~ubject is not alone sufficient; the admission 
which it is sought to use must have been made in 
connection with the discharge of the agent's duty, 
and must be a statement of fact, rather than an 
expression of opinion." 
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S. W. Bridges & Co. v. Candland et al., 88 Utah 373, 
54 P. 2d 842. This principle was adopted in a direct quo-
tation from Corpus Juris in the case of Fish Lake Resort 
Co. v. Industrial Commission of Utah et al., 73 Utah 479, 
275 P. 580. 
A ree:x;amination of the statements alleged to have 
been made by Mr. Borsum could only result in the con~ 
elusion that they are not statements of fact but conclu-
sions. The only statements alleged to have been made were 
to the effect that the amount of feed Mr. Scoville said he 
would sell would be a lot of feed, and that the company 
had money to pay a bonus if he· sold the feed,- and that 
he didn't see any reason why the bonus should be changed 
at that time. There is nowhere in the record any 'clear or 
convincing evidence of any statement . by Mr. Borsum 
which could constitute any basis upon which Mr. Scoville 
could predicate a recovery in this case. 
Much has been said about the conversations of Mr. 
Borsum in Minneapolis, and it has been pointed out that 
Mr. Scoville apparently accepted Mr. Borsum's statement 
to the effect that he had to accept the 1949 bonus as it 
was and that was the way it had to be. This very state~ 
ment that if anything was said, or if Mr. Borsum talked 
to the higher-ups, he and Mr. Williams and Mr. Scoville 
would lose their jobs, negatives authority to bind the 
company rather than support it. In Sweatman v. Linton 
et al., 66 Utah 208, 241 P. 309, this .court ruled on·a similar 
statement. There the purported a~nt and his principal 
were sued for malicious prosecution. In reversing the 
judgment for the plaintiff ·and in ruling that the motions 
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for non-suit and directed verdict on behalf of the Packing 
Company should have been granted; the court discussed 
the· following: 
u * * Plaintiff was again placed upon the wit-
ness stand and, over o,jection by defendants, testi-
fied that after his ·arrest and return to Price, and 
while he was out on bail, he met Linton on a street 
in that city. He also testified ( q~oting from the 
bill of exceptions) further as follows: 
u cAfter we met and he offered me his hand, 
he $aid (I'm glad to see you.' I put my hand behind 
me and I said, ci can't say as much for you.' I 
kind ·of rebuffed him and expressed some feeling. 
He stepped off and said: (Mr. Sweatman, I'm sorry 
you feel that way about it. It was nothing that I 
could help. I was ordered to do this by the com-
pany.' I argued with Crum (secretary of the pack-
ing comp~ny) that I didn't want to do it, but he 
says, cy ou go and do it,' and I was working for him, 
and it was up to me to do it or quit.' 
uThe packing company assigns the admission 
of that testimony as error. In our judgment the 
testimony was clearly inadmissible for the purpose 
of binding t~e packing company. It was not a state-
ment of the· agent as to the limit or extent of his 
authority in the transaction of 'any business in-
tru,sted.to him under his general employment, even 
if it be contended that it was admissible as defin-
ing the extent of his agency. The introduction of 
the evidence was an attempt by hearsay to bind the 
company upon a question admittedly not within 
the general scope of the agent's duty. * * *" 
The similarity between this statement and the statement 
allegedly made by Mr. Borsum is most striking. 
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We submit that these. alleged .statements, were inad ... 
missible under the rules set out above and that the evi9ence 
was insufficient to affirmatively establish that Mr. Borsum 
had authority to bind Kellogg Sales Company. We 
respectfully point out to the court also that the ruling 
by the court could not constitute prejudicial error where 
appellant's counsel informed the court they were intro-
duced to vary or modify a written instrument. 
POINT III 
THE COURT PROPERLY DIRECTED A VER-
DICT IN FAVOR OF THE DEFENDANT AND 
AGAINST THE PLAINTIFF. 
The defendant moved the court for a directed verdict, 
which motion the court granted. In Point IV of appel-
lant's brief he asserts that uThe trial court erred in direct-
ing a verdict for the company after wrongly excluded 
testimony which tended to establis/.J the case for Mr. 
Scoville." This statement acknowledges that if the testi-
mony which was excluded was not considered by the court, 
the granting of a directed verdict is correct, with which 
proposition we agree. Respondent moved. the court for 
a directed verdict upon the following grounds and for 
the following reasons: . 
eel. The only competent evidence shows, 
1948 bonus plan ended December 31, 1948, and 
any objection, and any allegation, or contention 
that said plan continue into all, or part of 1949 is 
against the law and evidence in this case. 
u2. The evidence shows the 1949 bonus plan 
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specifically is unambiguous and with certainty 
provided the' method for payment fo:r all bonuses 
or commissions for the year 1949, and the whole 
thereof, and in like manner verified and specified 
the termination of the 1948 bonus plan as of De-
cember 31, 1948. 
u3. The contracts for bonuses for 1948-1949 
are not ambiguous or uncertain, and cannot be 
varied by parol evidence as a matter of law, and 
must be strictly construed by this court, and so 
construed specifically provide and require the ap-
plication of the bonus provision of 1949 only 
to apply to the commissions of the plaintiff for 
that year. 
u4. The undisputed evidence shows that 
plaintiff received and acknowledged receipt of the 
1949 bonus contract from the defendant in July 
of 1949. That he continued in his employment 
thereafter, and that subsequent to 1949 he re-
ceived a final statement of his account for bonuses 
for 1949, together with checks in payment there-
for. 
uThat he failed to object thereto until many 
months thereafter. 
uThat, by reason of this ~conduct he is estopped 
to deny the existence or validity of the 1949 con-
tract, and that contract was made as payment 
in full. 
u5. The undisputed evidence establishes the 
receipt of a statement of account for the balance 
of plaintiff's bonus for 1949, and checks therefor, 
which plaintiff cashed without protest or offer 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
29 
to return, coupled with a failure to object to that 
within a reasonable time, and therefore said ac-
count became an account stated, or further, by 
reason of the circumstances and conduct of the 
parties prior to said acceptance and cashing, such 
constituted an accord and satisfaction, and in 
either event are conclusive upon him, and plain-
tiff cannot recover." (R. 85-86) 
Since appellant's position is limited to a considera-
tion by the court of evidence which was not the subject 
of a motion to strike because it was inadmissible, only the 
third ground of the motion for a directed verdict appears 
to be complained of by- him. We have already discussed 
the question of the admissibility -of parol evidence and 
wlll not revert to that argument. Admittedly, then, if 
any of the other four grounds upon which the motion for 
a directed verdict is good, the court did not err. 
But even if we consider the evidence with the stricken 
testimony back in the record, and considering all the evi-
dence in a light most favorable to the plaintiff, we :find 
the following to be wholly undisputed in the record: 
1. The plaintiff received and acknowledged receipt 
of the 1949 Bonus Plan from the defendant in July or 
August of 1949. 
2. The 1949 Bonus Plan specifically stated that the 
1948 Bonus Plan was terminated as of December 31, 1948. 
3. In January of 1950 plaintiff received notification 
that the Bonus Plan which had been in effect for 1949 
was discontinued and his salary was increased to $375 per 
month, without any Bonus Plan for 1950. 
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4. Plaintiff received a letter dated January 30, 1950 
enclosing a check for $3,544.35 to cover his Bonus for 
1949, calculated on the terms of the 1949 bonus plan and 
subject to revision if the :figures plaintiff was. sending to 
the company proved the company's :figures incorrect. 
5. Because of an error in failing to deduct his with-
holding tax plaintiff returned the check for $3,544.35 
and thereafter received a letter dated February 10, 1950 
thanking him for returning it and informing him that 
another check for the same amount less withholding tax 
had been sent to him. The letter also stated that the com-
pany was in the process of checking Mrs. Scoville's :figures 
on shipments and would make a complete adjustment as 
soon as those :figures had been audited. The check for 
$2,9 81.9 2 was received by Mr. Scoville. 
6. Plaintiff received a letter dated April 25, 1950 
enclosing a check for $1,026.88. The letter specifically 
stated the ,check represented the balance due on plaintiff's 
bonus for .1949. 
7. The checks for $2,981.92 and $1,026.88 were 
endorsed and cashed by plaintiff. 
8. Plaintiff informed the company of his retirement 
effective January 1, 19 51· and wrote his first protest on 
''the eve of his retirement, December 30, 1950, some seven-
teen months after receipt· of the. 1949 Bonus Plan and 
some eight months after a final statement of his 1949 bonus 
had been rendered and payment made thereunder. 
These foregoing facts are in chronological order and 
are wholly undisputed in the record. It is clear from these 
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facts that the conduct and actions of Scoville in accepting 
his statement of account and his payments for 1949 com-
puted according to the 1949 plan, preclude any present 
contention by him that he did so under protest. By such 
conduct he is estopped to deny the existence or validity of 
the 1949 plan and its application to him. He had many 
opportunities to protest, and if he seriously thought at 
those times that he was entitled to bonus payments under 
the 1948 plan or any other agreement different than the 
1949 plan, he surely would have registered some ~complaint. 
Twice in January he was written, once informing him .of 
the termination of the 1949 Bonus Plan and once enclos-
ing a check to pay him his bonus in 1949 according to the 
1949 plan. No protest occurred-in fact, he even sent 
the check back because of a ta~ deduction error, without 
complaint or even politely informing his company that 
the 1949 plan didn't apply to him. After the alleged ~con­
versations such as ttWith the bonus figured the way they 
are now, I am going to make a lot of money, around 
$30,000.00," and uYou are also going to .pay me a lot of 
bonus too," he cannot be heard to assert that the difference 
between $3,544.35 and the additional $16,183.53 alleged 
in his complaint went unnoticed. Nor did he protest 
about the check for $2,981.92 even after his wife's :figures 
were sent and audited and he knew the 1949 Bonus Plan 
was used to compute the amount due. And even when 
the :final check for $1,026.88 and a letter explaining that 
the check represented ((balance due on your bonus for 
1949" arrived, Mr. and Mrs. _Scoville remained mute for 
some eight months about the failure to receive a sum in 
excess of $16,000.00, more than once again as much as 
he had received for the whole year of 1949 in salary, 
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bonuses and expenses. He also knew he would receive no 
bonus for 1950 and only Q salary of $375.00 per month 
and expenses. 
Appellant has filled his brief with uinferences," but 
here are the stark, unadorned facts, not mere inferences, 
facts conclusively establishing an account stated or accord 
and satisfaction. These principles of law are stated in the 
alternative because of their distinct application to the 
undisputed facts in this case, and a discussion of the two 
principles will better illustrate this. 
The legal principle of an account stated has been 
recognized and applied by this court since the first vol-
ume of the Utah Reports. In Wm. S. Godbe v. Brigham 
Young, 1 Utah 55, the plaintiff had in the spring of 1865 
advanced to the defendant goods of the value of $10,020.27 
to be used in the construction of the Deseret Irrigation 
and Canal Co. Thereafter on the 12th day of February, 
1866, the plaintiff properly rendered an account to the 
defendant for the stated balance to which defendant made 
no protest. The court held that an account was stated 
and was conclusive: 
u* * tif the Defendant did not object within 
a reasonable time to an account presented to him, 
his assent may be presumed, and will support an 
action upon an account stated; and also that, (if 
when an account is rendered no objection is made 
to it, it i~ to be considered liquidated from the time 
it is rendered.' (Walden v. Sherburne, 15 Johns., 
409; Hall v. Morrison, 3 Bosw., 520; Case v. 
Hotchkiss, 3 Abb. N. S. 381; Hutchinson v. Bank, 
48 Barv., 302; Crane v. Hardman, 4 E. D. Smith, 
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448; Bainbridge v. Wilcocks, Baldw., 536-3d Cir.· 
Pa.)" 
This case was affirmed as to the account stated and re-
versed as to the question of interest payments and other 
matters not controlling here in 82 US 250, 15 Wall 562. 
A few years later in Benites v. Hampton, 3 Utah 369 
( 18 84) , this court paid recognition to the rul~ that a lapse 
of a reasonable time without objection creates an account 
stated. 
Again in ·1900 in Burraston v. First National Bank of 
Nephi, 22 Utah 328, this court applied the rule of an 
account stated. The plaintiff deposited money in ·the bank, 
drew checks and signed notes to the bank, but made no 
objection to the statements sent by the. bank to him from 
time to time. Even when his account was closed he made 
no objection to the final statement sent by the bank until 
some three years later. This court held that an account 
stated ended plaintiff's right of action and defendant's 
motion for a non-suit should have been granted. 
The foregoing cases are in point with the undisputed 
facts in our case. Since the facts are undisputed and clear 
as to the events subsequent to the letter of January 10, 
1950, the weight of authority holds that what constitutes 
a reasonable time within which objection must be made to 
an account rendered in order to preclude a presumption 
of acquiescence therein is always a question exclusively for 
the court. 18 A.L.R. 887, 895: ccWhat is a reasonable time 
where the facts are clear, is always a question exclusively 
for the court." The Annotation in 18 A.L.R. 887 is: 
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.u'Wbat is a reasonable time within which to object to an 
a(fcount so as to prevent its becoming an account stated." 
See Subheadings page 888 et seq. 
The legal principle of accord and .s·atisfaction is also 
applicable to the facts in this case. Defendant alleged 
this defense in the motion for a directed verdict in the 
alternative with· an account stated and the authorities have 
applied'both in such cases. 
In California Bean Growers' Association v. Rindge 
Land & Navigation Company, 248 Pac. 658, 47 A.L.R. 
904, (Cal. 1926) the Supreme Court affirmed a judgment 
for the plaintiff, a marketing association, against a defend-
ant member for liquidated damages as specified in a con-
tract for failure of defendant member to deliver certain 
bean crops. As to the defendant"s counter-claim the court 
found there had been an account stated and an accord and 
satisfaction. 
u c:In answer to the defendant's cross-com-
plaint, which contains the same matters set up as a 
set-off and as a counterclaim the plaintiff, in addi-
tion to denials of such matters, alleged, and the 
court found, that there had been an account stated 
between the parties and an accord and satisfaction 
as to the proceeds of the 1918 crop of beans. · 
* * * 
~c: cDuring the time the beans were held in stor-
age the plaintiff from time to time sent to defend-
ant statements of sales made and of charges debited 
to the defenda~t's. account, such as insurance, 
~leaning, and resacking beans, patching sacks, etc., 
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and the defendant often replied with complaints 
that the charges were excessive. September 16, 
1920, defendant wrote plaintiff, demanding a set-
tlement, and, among other things, saying: tYour 
auditor,s report which was submitted to us some 
time ago made the amazing statement that the 
money realized from the 1918 beans was actually 
used to :finance the 1919 crop. This seems to us 
incredible. If true, the directors have made them-
selves personally responsible, as they undoub_tedly 
did by refusing to sell the beans when a good price 
was offered early in 1919. We shall be obliged to 
take legal steps along these lines if a check is not 
promptly sent to us. We shall also take very de-
cided exceptions to your expense accounts as· they 
are extravagant beyond all reason. You have no 
right under the agreement to deduct more than 
$1.00 per ton for such expenses, and § 4 provides 
for the return of any unused portions of the $1.00 
per ton., Thereafter the plaintiff furnished the 
defendant with a complete statement of all receipts 
and disbursements in connection with the defend-
ant's 1918 beans, showing that all of such beans, 
except 3,500 pounds which were damaged, had 
been sold, and that.the defendant had been credited 
with a net balance on account of beans sold in the 
sum of $22,744.72. 
* * * 
uNovember 29, 1920, the plaintiff sent the 
defendant a check for $22,744.73, inclosed with 
a letter reading as follows: · tW e have pleasure in 
inclosing herewith our check No. 2525 'for $22,-
744.73 representing a final settlement of the 1918 
a·ccount, with the exception of two small lots which 
remain unsold; these were enumerated on a state-
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ment which we recently forwarded to. you.' On 
the followmg .day the defendant acknowledged 
receipt of the check in a letter. reading as follows: 
tW e are in receipt of your letter of November 29th, 
inclosing your check No. 3536 for $22~744.73.' 
February 24, 1951, plaintiff wrote defendant, in-
closing statement of sale of the damaged: beans and 
a check for the net proceeds thereof, amounting to 
$66.51, and saying: (This amount represents the 
final settlement on your 1918 account .. ' The de-
fendant cashed the first check November 30, 1920, 
and the second one February 26, 1921. The record 
does not show that the defendant made any objec-
tion to. the settlement until its answer was :filed 
herein August 18, 1921. 
u tThe foregoing evidence is sufficient to sup-
port the finding of the court to the effect that 
there was an .account stated between the parties 
and an accord and satisfaction. Berger v. Lane, 
190 Cal. 443, 447, 213 Pac. 45; Lapp-Gifford Co. 
v. MuscoyWaterCo. 166Cal. 25, 27, 134Pac. 989; 
Creighton v. Gregory, 142 Cal. 34, 39, 75 Pac. 
569; Schneider ·v. Oakman Consol. .Min. Co. 38 
Cal. App. 338, 3.42, 176 P.a.c. 177; Johnston v. 
Burnett,.17 Cal. App. 497, 120 Pac. 436, 34 A.L.R. 
1036, note. · 
* * * 
uln defendant's letter of September 16, 1920, 
it said: «you have no right under the agreement to 
deduct more than $1 per ton for such expenses, 
. and § 4 provides for the return of any unused 
portions of the $1 per ton.' It must be presumed, 
therefore, that the settlement disposed of that 
controversy. The payments of November 29, 1920, 
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and February 24, 1921, were made expressly as ca 
final settlement of the 1918 account,' ,and it must 
be presumed that the settlement included all credits 
to which the defendant was entitled. The stated 
account and the accord and satisfaction are not 
attacked on the ground of fraud or mistake in 
the procurement thereof." 
We have cited from this case ~at considerable length due 
to the similarity in facts to our case. It appears from the 
cases that if no real dispute as to the account as rendered 
existed, or if acquiescence is presumed from lack of objec-
tion for a reasonable time, an .account is stated and plaintiff 
is precluded from recovery. If it appears that any dispute 
existed and payment is made thereon and defendant indi-
cates that it is in :final settlement, the acceptance of such 
by the plaintiff constitutes accord and satisfactiol). This is 
well set out in Wpllace v. Crawford, 69 P. 2d 455 (Cal. 
1937), where an accounting on rice payments was sent 
and received and showed . the amount sold to defendant 
by plaintiff together with a check for that amount. It was 
held that such constituted ~n account stated and accord· 
and satisfaction: 
ult is a general rule of law that the acceptance 
of payment of a balance shown to be due on an 
account rendered by a debtor to his creditor ordi-
narily constitutes an account stated as against the 
party accepting the payment which precludes the 
creditor from thereafter questioning the accuracy 
of the account. Hansen v. Fresno Jersey Farm 
Dairy Company, 220 Cal. 402, 31 P. (2d) 359; 
1 C.J. 689 § 270. 
* * * 
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. u* * In 1 California Jurisprudence, p. 134, § 
10, it is said: <The great weight of authority in 
Americ,an courts undoubtedly supports the rule 
· that where the amount due is in dispute and a check 
for an amount less than that claimed is sent to 
the creditor with a statement that it is sent in full 
satisfaction of the claim, and the tender is ac-
complished by such acts or declarations ,as amount 
to a condition that if the check is accepted at all it 
is accepted in full satisfaction of the disputed 
claim, and the creditor so understands, its accep-
tance by the creditor constitutes an accord and 
satisfaction, even though the creditor states at the 
time that the amount tendered is not accepted in 
full satisfaction.' " 
The general rule of law announced in the California 
Bean Growers' Association case, supra, was approved by 
this court in Ashton v. Skeen, 85 Utah 489, 39 P. 2d 1073, 
(1935). At page 496 of the Utah reports this court.noted 
the elements of accord and satisfaction: 
uAppellant next urges that the delivery by 
him to Ford Bros. of the cashier's check for $2,500, 
indorsed as the evidence shows it was, which they 
have not returned but continue to hold, consti-
tuted an accord and satisfaction of any claim which 
they had against him for the money collected on 
the Foss account, and that he was therefore en-
titled to judgment. Before there can ·be an accord 
and satisfaction by acceptance of a less sum than 
claimed, there must be an unliquidated claim or a 
bona fide disp~te as to the amount thereof. It is 
not necessary for the claim to be well founded, but 
it must be made in ·good faith, otherwise there is 
no consideration for an agreement to accept a less 
sum, and the agreement is void. See 1 C. J. 551 to 
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556, §§ 71 to 77; Page on Contracts,§§ '615 to 620; 
Williston on Contracts § 129; Gray v. Bullen, 50 
Utah 270, 167 P. 683, Robwer v. Burrell, 42 Utah 
510, 134 P. 573; Smoot v. Checketts, 41 Utah 211, 
125 P. 412, Ann. Cas. 1915C, 113." 
These principles are recognized in the following cases: 
RAlph A. Badger & Co. v. Fidelity Building & Loan Ass'n., 
94 Utah 97,75 P. 2d 669 (1938); Browning v. Equitable 
Life .Assur. Soc. of the United States, 94 Utah 532, 72 P. 
\ 
2d 1060 (Utah, 1937); Sullivan v. Beneficial Life Ins. Co., 
90 Utah 405, 64 P. 2nd 351 (Utah, 1937); Bell v. Jones, 
100 Utah 87, 110 P. 2d 327 (Utah 1941). 1 Am. Jur. 
225-6, § 24 of the Chapter on Accord and Satisfaction 
has this to say, and without qualification: 
uThe creditor to whom a check is sent or 
other remittance made as payment in full has the 
option either of accepting it on the conditions on 
which it is sent, or of rejecting it. When· a claim 
is in dispute, and the debtor sends to his creditor a 
check or other remittance which he clearly states is 
in full payment of the claim, and the creditor ac-
cepts the remittance or collects the check without 
objection it is generally recognized that this con-
stitutes a good accord and satisfaction. The· mo-
ment the creditor indorses and collects the check, 
with knowledge that it was .offered only upon 
condition, .he thereby agrees to the condition and 
is estopped from denying such agreement. It is 
then that the minds of the parties meet and the con-
tract of accord and satisfaction becomes complete. 
It is not necessary that it be shown that the creditor 
knows the legal effect of his acceptance of the 
check, as the mere acceptance will be regarded as 
assent." 
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Section 26 of the same authority at pages 228-229 
states the further rule that the fact that the creditor pro-
tests against accepting the tender in full payment will not 
prevent the transaction from constituting a good accord 
and satisfaction, and even if it is accepted under the 
mistake of law that it will not operate as a satisfaction. 
Section 29 at page 230 points out that .even the retention 
of a check for an unreasonable le~gth. of time without re-
turning it might constitute full satisfaction. And. the 
conclusiveness of accord and satisfaction is found in Sec~ 
tion 72 at pages 255 to 256: 
((As inherent in the definition, an accord and 
satisfaction operates as a final bar to the demand 
or subject-matter of the agreement for accord and 
satisfaction. And where the accord or new agree-
ment itself is accepted in satisfaction, no action can 
be maintained on the old obligation. As a conse-
quence, a valid accord and satisfaction renders un-
necessary a consideration of the defense of the 
Statute of Frauds or of· any defense on the merits 
to the items which were originally in dispute. 
Moreover, a debt which is satisfied by an accord 
and satisfaction is extinguished for all purposes and 
cannot constitute the consideration for a new 
promise to pay the balance." 
Reference is made in the foregoing citations to the 
annotation in 75 ALR at page 905. ((Acceptance by check 
purporting to be cin full' or accompanied by indications 
of debtor,s intention that it be so regarded." This anno-
tation supplements the same annotation in 34 ALR 1035 
and both are referreq to in State et al v. Campbell Bldg. 
Co.,. et al, 94 Utah 326, 77 P. 2d 341 (Utah, 1938). The 
·general rule in 34 ALR at page 1036 is given: 
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uBy the great weight of authority the accep-
tance and use of a remittance by check, purporting 
to be tin full,' or employing words of simila~ im-
port, or accompanied by a letter to that effect, 
amount to an accord and satisfaction of the larger 
claim of the creditor, assuming that the claim was 
unliquidated or disputed, so that an express agree-
.ment to accept, and the actual acceptan.ce of, the 
smaller amount in full satisfaction, would have 
been binding." 
75 ALR 905 provides: 
uThe following cases reiterate and follow the 
general rule announced in the earlier annotation, 
to the effect that the acceptance and use of a re-
mittance by check, purporting to be fin full,·' or 
employing words of similar import, or accompanied 
by a letter to that effect, .constitute an accord and 
satisfaction of the larger claim of the creditor, as-
suming that the claim was unliquidated or disputed, 
so that an express agreement to accept, and the 
actual acceptance of, the smaller amount. in full 
satisfaction, would have been binding." 
The cases cited therein are also so numerous as to 
prohibit excerpting them, and the illustrations provide 
many, many cases directly in point with our instant case, 
all holding an accord and satisfaction proved. 
We respectfully submit that appellant's facts place 
him squarely into an account stated or an accord and 
satisfaction, and he is estopped to deny it. His account 
was· computed according to the 1949 bonus and is pre-
sumed and conclusive when he cashed the checks and failed 
to object within a reasonable time, such account being 
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considered. liquidated from the time it was rendered. W m~ 
S . . God be v. Brigham Young et al, supra. If Scoville claims 
such account was disputed, then his cashing of the check 
representing the balance due for his bonus for 1949 consti-
tuted an accord and satisfaction. 
We have stated that the evidence is undisputed as to 
the facts establishing an account stated or accord and 
satisfaction and such are established without any of the 
testimony claimed by appellant to have· been wrongly ex-
cluded. Even if such testimony were admitted it would 
be of little aid to appellant, for it would likewise conclu-
sively establish accord and satisfaction for appellant's only 
contention is that· it cctended" to establish a dispute prior 
to the receipt of his account and the checks which checks 
he cashed without protest. 
CONCLUSION 
The record clearly shows: That all alleged conversa-
tions between Mr .. Scoville and Mr. Williams or Mr. Bor-
sum were· offered by appellant in an attempt to vary, 
modify or abrogate the 1949 writing. That these conversa-
tions were prior to the receipt and acknowledgment of the 
1949 writing~ That counsel for appellant advised the court 
during the trial that the very purpose of such conversation 
was to vary the 1949 written contract not received until 
some time after the conversation took place. The trial 
court was en titled to rely upon the statement of plaintiff's 
counsel in considering the admissibility of the conversa-
tions. That the conversations themselves, read separately 
or cons~dered as a whole, and indulging in all the inferences 
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for which appellant contends, do not elevate themselves 
to the dignity of an agreement, separate and distinct from 
the writings introduced into evidence. The undisputed 
evidence clearly shows that Mr. Scoville accepted the 
terms of the 1949 writing and his conduct and actions 
preclude any contention on his part of non-assent. 
Under the law and the facts in this case, these alleged 
conversations were clearly inadmissible and the trial court 
properly granted defendant's motion to strike them as 
violating the rule against parol evidence. 
Not only were the alleged conversations with Mr. 
Borsum inadmissible because they violate the parol evi-
dence rule, they were subject to the further objection 
that they were offered in an attempt to bind Kellogg Sales 
Company when no adequate showing of his authority to 
so bind was made. The burden of proof was appellant's 
and no conjecture as to why such proof is lacking, or that 
such proof is provided by inferences, is sufficient to sustain 
that burden. Nor can the hearsay evidence of Mr. Scoville 
as to what the purported agent himself told him fill the 
gap. In fact, the alleged conversation in Minneapolis actu-
ally negatives the cloak of authority and indicates that Mr. 
Borsum would lose his job if he assumed it. The trial 
court properly granted defendant's motion to strike such 
testimony. 
All of the evi~ence, either with or without the ex-
cluded testimony, establishes an account stated or accord 
and satisfaction. The 1949 writing was unambiguous 
and the evidence shows its receipt. Mr. Scoville received 
an accounting in accordance with its terms, and if he did 
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not then dispute such account and the evidence is clear 
that he. thereafter received, ·endorsed and cashed checks 
for payments in accordance with the account, an account 
is stated and he is- precluded from recovery. His alleged 
conversations lend him no comfort, for if they infer any-
thing, they either infer a dispute or they don't and if a. 
dispute in fact existed, then accord and satisfaction is con-
clusive upon him. All of the facts and circumstances of 
this case are clear in the record. No conjecture is needed 
and the pattern is distinct. The trial court properly ap-
plied the law governing all the evidence adduced and 
granted defendant's motion for a directed verdict. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAY, QUINNEY & NEBEKER, 
GRANT C. AADNESEN 
Attorneys for Defendtmt 
a11,d Respondent 
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